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A safer, faster, leaner workplace? Technical-
maintenance worker perspectives on digital 
drone technology ‘effects’ in the European 
steel industry
Dean Stroud  and Martin Weinel
This paper focuses on technical-maintenance worker perspec-
tives on the insertion of digitised drone technologies in the Eu-
ropean steel industry. The industry is aiming for a ‘business 
model transformation’ by means of digitalisation, which in-
cludes the use of drone technologies for maintenance functions. 
In this paper, we explore on what basis might such workers 
embrace or resist this new technology. Drawing on data from 
a project investigating the use of drones for a ‘safer, faster and 
leaner’ workplace, we employ an analysis of technology ‘ef-
fects’ to discuss the risks and benefits to workers of drone tech-
nologies (see Orlikowski, Organ. Sci., 3, 1992, 398; Edwards and 
Ramirez, New Technol. Work Employ., 31, 2016, 99). The insertion 
and use of drone technology within the industry raises ques-
tions for the industry’s highly skilled workers and their repre-
sentatives on the ‘effect’ of drone innovations on the industry’s 
existing structures and patterns of work.
Keywords: digital technology, industry 4.0, technological inno-
vations, technology ‘effects, steel industry.
Introduction
An increasingly discussed feature of work and employment is the emergence of the 
‘digital workplace’. For manufacturing specifically, it is often referred to as ‘Industry 
4.0’, which emerged from Germany as a central economic and industrial policy in 2011 
and has since taken on wider resonance across Europe (Pfeiffer, 2017). Here, 
production is configured upon digital networking systems and the centrality of ‘big 
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data’ for ‘smart factories’, with such developments argued to carry numerous implica-
tions for the organisation, structure and experience of manufacturing employment (see 
Briken et al, 2017).
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of the Industry 4.0 workplace and the 
‘effects’ of a specific piece of digitised robotic technology, that is unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAVs) or drones. Specifically, we employ technical-maintenance steelworker per-
spectives on drones to discuss their ‘effect’ as a piece of technology and consider the 
threats they pose to workers, as well as the opportunities they offer. These more highly 
skilled workers, in the steel industry context, tend to retain more autonomy, discretion 
and control over their work, but the insertion of digital technological innovation in the 
advanced manufacturing workplace may well begin to threaten such workers’ ability to 
resist processes of alienation and deskilling (see Frey and Osbourne, 2017).
Set within the context of Pfeifer’s (2017) discussion of the emergence of Industry 4.0, 
we view the relationship between workers and the introduction of digitised drone 
technology through the lens of Orlikowski’s (1992) and Edwards’ and Ramirez’s (2016) 
combined (six) dimensions of technology ‘effects’. In employing this analytical frame, 
we ask a research question similar to that posed by Edwards and Ramirez (2016: 99) in 
their discussion of new technologies in the workplace: ‘[on what basis might techni-
cal-maintenance steelworkers] embrace or resist new [drone] technology’? We thus 
consider how one category of worker perceives the effect of a specific piece of new 
technology and the tension between its risks and benefits. Our contribution is to pro-
vide a case analysis of (intermediate to high-skilled) worker perspectives on emerging 
digital technologies and their insertion in the advanced manufacturing workplace, 
thereby adding to the limited empirical work in this area (Briken et al, 2017).
Our data come from a Research Fund for Coal and Steel (RFCS) project investigating 
the use of drones for identifying leaks from gas pipes and the need for repairs to roofs 
and chimneys in steel plants in Germany and Italy. Alongside developing new drone 
and digital sensor technologies, the project aims to explore how drones might enhance 
occupational health and safety (OHS) (e.g. reducing the need for work at height) and 
improve productivity (e.g. identifying repairs more quickly and reducing labour costs 
by ‘substituting’ workers with drones). The intention is for a safer and more efficient 
workplace, but one that might intensify work and threaten, for some, to remove it en-
tirely. In what follows we begin by outlining the steel industry context for insertion of 
the drone technology. Second, we situate our discussion within literatures on the rela-
tionship between (digital) technology and work. Third, we give an account of Industry 
4.0 and our analytical frame. Research design forms the fourth section of the paper. 
Thereafter, we discuss the data across three themes, that is i) insertion, ii) work ‘effects’ 
and iii) worker representation, before discussion and concluding comments.
The steel industry context
The context for our discussion is the European steel industry, which over past decades 
has experienced major processes of restructuring. The implications for the workforce 
have been considerable, despite high levels of worker representation across the sector. 
Those directly employed to the industry have reduced from 800,000 (EU15) in 1980 to 
320,000 (EU28) in 2018, with further losses of 30 per cent anticipated by 2025 (Eurofer, 
2018). As numbers have declined, the character of the workforce has changed. It is now a 
smaller, differently recruited and organised workforce, relying less on routine work and 
‘factory hand’ workers and more on the more highly skilled and qualified (Bacon and 
Blyton, 2000; Stroud, 2012). We consider this detail important because it establishes the 
context within which the steel industry workforce experiences processes of innovation.
Not all industry innovation is technological, for example the introduction of team 
working and high-performance working to the industry during the 1980s and 1990s 
signalled innovatory efforts to improve productivity and performance at an organisa-
tional level (Bacon and Blyton, 2000). Similarly, the focus of many technological inno-
vations is to reduce costs, improve efficiency and remain competitive. Digitalisation is 
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vaunted as the most recent feature of industry innovation and identified as a means for 
achieving a ‘business model transformation’ (Naujok and Stamm, 2017). It is claimed 
that the industry will increasingly turn towards 3D-printing for spare parts, digitally 
enhanced tracking and operational systems for improved maintenance functions and 
the use of drone technologies for generating data on maintenance and production 
(Naujok and Stamm, 2017). Indeed, the data informing this paper derive from a project 
that has as its objective the use of digitised drone technology ‘to substitute men (sic) in 
complex and expensive operations… related to the monitoring, maintenance and safety of steel 
plant infrastructures’, which fits with industry efforts to digitalise operations and inno-
vate for efficiency.
Drones, technology and work
Essentially, drones are flying robots and can be controlled remotely or operate autono-
mously, with the latter not currently permitted by EU regulations. Drone use is highly 
regulated within the EU and licences are required for commercial use, but regulations are 
constantly evolving. The latter reflects the continuing development of the technology 
and, moreover, the European Commission’s (EC) support for the development of the 
UAV industry; the objective is for the creation of 150,000 drone-related jobs by 2050 
(European Parliament, 2018). Drone use is certainly expanding within a range of sectors, 
for example in construction there are experiments with monitoring, inspection and main-
tenance (Bogue, 2018) and in retail Amazon has trialled parcel delivery (Hern, 2016).
Drones can be employed in a variety of ways: for monitoring, inspection and mainte-
nance purposes, but also for delivering materials and equipment and applying paints and 
chemicals. A common feature of their use is the capturing of images (e.g. photographs, 
video, thermal and infrared), and this has raised questions about data protection and 
surveillance at work (Ball, 2010). As it is, current data protection regulations at EU and 
member state level offer some protection for workers, as do firm specific negotiated 
agreements involving trade unions and works councils (as within our research sites). But, 
their use, particularly when fitted with digitalised data gathering sensor and camera tech-
nologies and the (individuated production) data collection and ‘dataveillance’ (Lupton, 
2016) they allow, presents new challenges for the regulation of work and employment.
Such technological developments give rise to new debates, which are concerned 
with the ‘digital workplace’ and workers’ acceptance of (or resistance to) technologies 
that threaten fundamental changes to the nature of work. However, as Howcraft and 
Taylor (2014) note, in many ways these debates rehearse old dilemmas and perennial 
concerns on the relationship between work and technology. Two opposing perspec-
tives have commonly delineated this relationship, which have special resonance for 
this paper’s analysis and begin to inform the approach we take to discussing technol-
ogy ‘effects’. The first perspective, associated with Blauner (1964) and others, priori-
tises technology as an objective and external force inserted in the workplace, 
determining of the organisational aspects of work and affording an industry its dis-
tinctive character: for the steel industry, its blast furnaces and rolling mills.
A second perspective emerges out of sociological efforts to counter such technologi-
cal determinism, and to bring society back into dialogue with technology and under-
stand its effects as socially and politically variable (Gallie, 1978). Labour process theory, 
for example, discusses how the relations of power and control are critical to the devel-
opment, selection and deployment of workplace technology and the seemingly irre-
sistible logic of efficiency and productivity (Braverman, 1974). However, as MacKenzie 
et al. (2017) note, the work of Braverman and other labour process scholars is also 
characterised by some as determinist, for example social constructivists. Certainly the 
accusation might be that digital technology is discussed in determining ways, with the 
inevitability of more highly rewarding work for some (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 
2014), technologically induced unemployment for others (Frey and Osborne, 2017; 
Neufeind et al., 2018) and, perhaps, the end of work entirely (Spencer, 2018).
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Wacjman (2018: 168) questions this ‘inevitability’ and, in particular, ‘the widespread 
assumption that digital technologies… [are making us]… ‘mere hostages to the accelerat-
ing drive of machines’. Indeed, the aim of the RFCS project is to employ digitised ‘ma-
chines’ to accelerate maintenance functions, but there is no temporal logic inherent in 
digital technologies. The broader assessment is that digital technologies may well trans-
form ‘how we work, live and communicate’, but they are not neutral, value-free tools that 
simply drive changes in society… but inherently social… crystallisations of society’ 
(Wacjman, 2018: 169–171). With such sentiments we agree, but at the same time our focus 
on ‘technology effects’ gives a level of primacy to technology that brings accusations of 
determinism (Edwards and Ramirez, 2016). We are mindful, however, of technologically 
determinist predictions, and that any analysis of ‘the future role of the digital in capital-
ism [must] embrace an understanding of varied contexts, power relations, choices and 
decision structures and the capacity for resistance’ (Thompson and Briken, 2017: 258).
Thus, when asking about the effects of technology, like Edwards and Ramirez, 2016: 
100–101), we position it as an external force, but one that is shaped by economic and 
political forces and with impacts moderated by human actors and organisational con-
texts, and in this way we ascribe to something more of a ‘soft’ determinism (Orlikowski, 
1992: 400). We draw parallels with MacKenzie et al. (2017: 736). For the latter, in adopt-
ing an ‘affordances perspective’ to discuss digital technology and the occupational 
identity of telecommunications engineers, there is a reconciling of structure and agency 
that counters accusations of technological determinism. It is an account that recognises 
the distinct features and characteristics of technology and the ‘affordance’ of opportu-
nities and possibilities for action that derive from the skilled worker’s engagement 
with the technical object (MacKenzie et al., 2017: 736). In similar ways, we draw on an 
analysis of technological ‘effects’, to foreground the perspectives of technical-mainte-
nance steelworkers on the dis/empowering capacities of drone technology and its ef-
fects on the material realities of work and employment.
Industry 4.0 and the ‘effects’ of digital technology
As a term, Industry 4.0 aims to capture the rise or revolution in new levels of techno-
logical developments within manufacturing. However, as a ‘newly emerging global 
production regime’, Sabine Pfeiffer (2017: 23) asks questions about the powers and in-
terests involved in its creation. Pfeiffer employs Burawoy’s (1985) analysis of the ‘pol-
itics of production’ to argue that Industry 4.0 does not, in fact, receive its legitimacy 
from ‘new technical possibilities but rather from economic ‘exigencies’ as identified by 
economic elites’ (2017:26). The accusation is that Industry 4.0 is a discourse focused on 
campaigning to change the way we work and obtain worker consent and acceptance of 
technological change (Pfeiffer, 2017: 33). Pfeiffer’s concern is with the emergence of a 
‘digital despotism’, which can be observed in the way Industry 4.0 innovations are 
employed by powerful actors (i.e. corporations, nation states and regional and global 
institutions) to build control.
It is in Pfeiffer’s analysis of Industry 4.0 that we begin to identify a foundation for the 
way new technology ‘effects’ within advanced manufacturing contexts might be dis-
cussed. Our concern, from a worker’s perspective, is to explore the tension between 
what Pfeiffer identifies as the ‘role of (drone) technology’ as ‘digitalised artefacts of 
advancement’, that is presenting new opportunities for growth, decent work and ‘po-
tential [as] instruments of collective solidarity’ on the one hand, a potential that Pfeiffer 
questions, and the potential for drone use as ‘instruments of atomisation and control’, 
on the other (2017: 35–36). Edwards and Ramirez (2016: 101) similarly note workers’ 
interest in ‘the forces of production because this potentially creates more and better 
jobs’ (i.e. decent work and, thus, benefits), and contrasts this with the ‘tendency in 
capitalism towards the use of technology to reduce workers’ control of the process of 
production’, by coercion or more direct means (i.e. risks).
There is a long history of argument here, with classic labour process theory noting 
management’s propensity to deploy technology in ways that consolidates control, 
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deskilling workers and alienating them from their work and the organisation of pro-
duction (Braverman, 1974). But later works challenge such perspectives, giving greater 
scope for workers, afforded by the skills and knowledge they possess, to limit manage-
ment control over work and the insertion of new technologies (Wood, 1982). Other 
assessments of technological change and work organisation suggest a polarisation of 
skill requirements, and concomitant differences in the affordance of workplace discre-
tion (Gallie, 1991). Similar outcomes are anticipated of digitalisation and Industry 4.0, 
with higher skilled workers forecast to gain greater control, discretion and autonomy 
over their work and the way it is organised, including with regard to the use and de-
ployment of technology, whereas intermediate and lower grades might find them-
selves replaced by technology (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Frey and Osbourne, 
2017). Pfeiffer (2017: 21–41), however, imagines little difference in the emerging for-
tunes of different categories of industrial worker, with new manufacturing technolo-
gies promoting rationalisation, standardisation and deskilling, culminating in a wider 
workplace malaise, that is ‘digital despotism’.
It is with these discussions in mind that we repurpose the question posed by Paul 
Edwards and Paulina Ramirez on ‘technology effects’ to ask: on what basis might 
high-skilled technical-maintenance steelworkers embrace or resist new drone technol-
ogy? To address this question, we draw on Edwards’ and Ramirez’s (2016) analytical 
frame of technology effects, which takes as its foundation Wanda Orlikowski’s (1992: 
398) theoretical model for examining the interaction between technology and organi-
sations, and the insights it provides for understanding technology effects amid ‘the 
limits and opportunities of human choice, technology development and use, and or-
ganisational design’. Orlikowski discusses three effects: (i) intended and unintended 
effects, (ii) direct and indirect effects, and (iii) reconstitution in use, and; in develop-
ment of this work Edwards and Ramirez identify a further three dimensions: (iv) im-
manence of effect, (v) degree of success, and (vi) degree of discontinuity). For reasons 
of space, we do not provide a detailed discussion of the dimensions but instead draw 
upon Edwards’ and Ramirez’s application of them to Industry 4.0 to illustrate the es-
sential features (2016: 110–111).
Edwards and Ramirez suggest, more broadly, of the dimensions of ‘effect’ that they 
might be used to inform workers and their representatives’ response to new technolo-
gies. This suggestion, it might be argued, has a particular resonance for Industry 4.0 
technology, which will differ significantly from the technology it replaces, i.e. its dis-
continuity and that it introduces highly disruptive innovations in areas of production. 
Of immanence and that inscribed within technology to produce certain outcomes, digi-
tal technology may reduce physical strain but increase scope for control and monitor-
ing. Degree of success is framed by the different interests involved (e.g. management, 
workers) in decisions on technology’s adoption and use, including social (i.e. negotia-
tion of adoption) and technological (i.e. the efficacy of the technology) aspects. For 
Industry 4.0, this speaks to how adoption is determined by political and economic ar-
guments (cf. Pfeiffer, 2017): ‘Economically, it offers a means of accumulation for capi-
tal, hence perhaps the eagerness of some firms for it. Politically… it offers a vision of a 
manufacturing renaissance and a means to prevent the exodus of jobs from the ad-
vanced economies’ (Edwards and Ramirez, 2016: 110).
The above Industry 4.0 ‘effects’ are discussed as direct and intended effects, that is ef-
fects that refer to the technology’s purpose, for example introducing technology to re-
duce physical strain is a direct and intended effect. A direct effect can also include any 
unintended effect, for example heightened capacity for monitoring of workers might be a 
direct but unintended effect, particularly where reconstitution in use is added, that is where 
the technology of production is constituted by management or workers in new ways. It 
is suggested that the manufacturing flexibility of Industry 4.0 technology will mean 
high levels of reconstitution. What is also suggested of Industry 4.0 technologies is that 
wider indirect effects might emerge, such as the greater likelihood of precarious work 
(e.g. crowd workers) and new technologies changing the structure of jobs and thus the 
balance of costs and benefits to workers. Edwards’ and Ramirez’s (2016) observations of 
Industry 4.0 are quite general, but in what follows we employ the six dimensions as an 
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analytical frame to focus on the potential ‘effects’ of a particular piece of Industry 4.0 
technology, that is drones, from the perspective of what are intermediate to highly 
skilled technical-maintenance workers, and provide an account of digital technology 
insertion within a specific and highly collectivised manufacturing industry context.
The research
The data informing this paper are from a RFCS project exploring the potential for 
drone use in the steel industry, focusing on roof and chimney inspection and monitor-
ing in Italy (SteelCo.IT) and gas pipe inspection and monitoring in Germany (SteelCo.
DE). The choice of each site reflects the project partnership composition. Each site vis-
ited is of comparable size, employs the same production processes and has near equiv-
alent production capacity. SteelCo.DE directly employs 13,500 people. Most of our 
interviewees worked within its Technology, Service and Energy (TSE) section, which 
has overall responsibility for gas pipelines, with two others employed in a near-by 
plant belonging to the same company and two persons from the Human Resources. 
SteelCo.IT directly employs in the region of 12,000 workers, with our participants 
working in a range of different roles—systems and maintenance engineering and roof 
maintenance—within various sections of the plant: roof repair, galvanising production 
and the cold rolling mill.
Our work on the project was to explore the impact on workers of drone use in two 
ways:
1. Social requirements, for example safety and surveillance and risk and harm 
arising from drone activity, including the regulatory and ethical implications 
of being observed at work and the risk arising from new technologies (e.g. job 
losses and occupational safety).
2. Impact on work activities, for example what changes to steelworkers’ work 
might arise from introducing drones? for example new means of inspecting 
roofs and new forms of data.
We conducted several hours of group interviews during two-day (Italy) and three-
day (Germany) visits. Tours of the plants allowed us to directly observe some of the 
contexts for drone deployment. The interviewees were chosen by ‘gatekeepers’, that is 
section managers at each site—the managers having first been informed of the purpose 
of the project.
The selection of the sample by section managers at each site has clear implications 
for the generation of data and what inferences might be drawn. However, gaining ac-
cess to the sites would not have been possible without agreement of each plants’ senior 
management and, in Germany, the Works Council. Okumus et al. (2007) discuss such 
dilemmas and the use of gatekeepers and selection bias, particularly when ‘getting in’ 
organisations and ‘getting on’ to discuss sensitive topics—as was the case here (e.g. the 
potential substitution of workers with technology). Sometimes it is not possible to sys-
tematically select participants and the autonomy of the research is threatened, but 
gatekeepers can also act as facilitators, as much as barriers, and the selection of re-
search participants was extensively discussed and negotiated utilising both Skype and 
face-to-face meetings. Here, we were able to set out the aims of the project and discuss 
with the gatekeepers who should be interviewed, with their more intimate knowledge 
of operations informing discussion. The outcome was a focus on intermediate to high-
skilled technical-maintenance workers as those most likely to be involved with/af-
fected by drones. The omission of production workers whose work might also be 
detrimentally affected by drone technologies means that caution should be exercised 
regarding any wider claims.
Of note is that in Italy we were explicitly denied access to trade union representa-
tives or officials. As such, we spoke to trade union members and they voiced their 
views (not as trade unions members per se, but as workers involved in the processes 
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under investigation who happened to be members of a trade union). Interviews in 
Germany included members of the Works Council and we spoke to trade union mem-
bers, but it was not thought necessary by those organising the interviews to involve 
trade union representatives. The important difference here is in the relationship be-
tween management and unions at each site, which was regarded by our contacts as 
‘difficult’ at the site in Italy. By difficult, it is that the plant has long been under threat 
of closure (or acquisition, which a year later materialised) and this created tensions 
between management and the site unions. Overall, there is a greater degree of confi-
dence in the SteelCo.DE data, which through the Works Council’s direct involvement 
ensured a more balanced perspective when compared to the Italy data.
Table 1 lists the interviews completed, which were organised as group interviews. 
Our interviewees were highly experienced workers, all male bar one HR manager, 
qualified from intermediate to high level, and aged between mid-30s to late 50s. 
Interviews were conducted on-site by two researchers—using an interpreter where 
necessary. Each interview lasted between one and two hours, allowing detailed data to 
be collected and we also cross-checked information with those organising the inter-
views. Interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and, if necessary, translated. 
Important in the process of analysis was opening-up the themes of the study, as a way 
of focusing on and understanding the worker perspectives on the insertion of digital 
innovations. The analysis comprised reading and re-reading of transcripts drawing 
out themes reflecting the project remit, as specified above. Overall, we explored com-
plex arrangements, but gained clarity of understanding through our engagements as 
researchers with those employed at the sites visited.
Steelworker perspectives on drone use
In this section, we discuss our interviewees’ perspectives and observations on drone 
technology and the potential ‘effects’ of its insertion across three thematic sub-sections. 
We asked our participants to speculate on the ‘effects’ of inserting drones, for monitor-
ing purposes primarily but the interviewees discussed their wider uses too, and how 
they might fit with current ways of working and what risks and benefits to their work 
and employment they might carry.
Inserting drones in the steel industry
At both companies, organisational restructuring processes have occurred in the recent 
past and ‘flat teams’ have been introduced as basic organisational units to reduce hier-
archies and promote high-performance working (see Bacon and Blyton, 2000). The fo-
cus on organisational considerations is relevant because they allow us to consider how 
drones might be inserted into existing plant structures and the subsequent ‘effects’ on 
working arrangements. On this, our participants in Germany, envisaged three scenar-
ios: (i) the integration of drone technology within existing teams; (ii) the creation of a 
specialist drone unit; and (iii) the outsourcing of expertise, with the overriding view 
that:
We would have to create a team of experts here that has the relevant capacity…. I cannot see a situ-
ation where every section or team has their own drone… 
(Service Division, Maintenance Engineer, Team Leader, SteelCo.DE)
The interviewees at SteelCo.IT were more inclined towards training workers for 
drone use within separate sections, rather than a centralised drone operation team or 
outsourced expertise, but overall no immediate organisational challenges were identi-
fied at either plant on the insertion of drones into current work arrangements.
Such perspectives reflect the way team working has been introduced within each 
plant, and the organisational flexibility and autonomous (and more highly skilled) 
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workgroups, aimed at increased productivity and innovation performance, that now 
define work and employment within the sector (Bacon and Blyton, 2000; Stroud, 2012). 
Any mention of outsourcing, for example Germany, was more of a cost issue and 
buffer against work fluctuations, which reflects some scepticism that drone use (by 
individual teams) would be sufficient to necessitate the associated (training and hard-
ware) investment. The preference for a separate team or incorporation within existing 
teams is a comment on how drone use is imagined for optimal use within each plant, 
but the disruptive ‘effect’ (or discontinuity) of the technology on immediate working 
arrangements and work tasks is viewed to be minimal.
Indeed, at both plants the functional flexibility of the teams means that the introduc-
tion of drones would only replace inspection tasks, which constitutes a limited part of 
overall work: ‘inspection is just part of the job, not the whole job’ [Galvanising, 
Maintenance Engineer, Section Leader, SteelCo.IT]. There is, moreover, little fear of 
technologically induced unemployment (i.e. substitution), as a direct effect of drone 
technology:
There would be no change in the numbers of men needed, the repair work still has to be done… it 
would just save their time in going to inspect and monitor…. Repair work is a manual job, a human 
job – drones can’t do it. 
(Roof Inspection, Roofer, Team Leader, SteelCo.IT)
Our interviewees remain quite sanguine about the ‘effects’ of drone technologies 
and the threat of disruption deriving from their insertion, including to jobs. Job loss is 
forecast to be a feature of steel industry digitalisation, mostly for routine manual work-
ers, as it is from processes of digitalisation more generally (Naujok and Stamm, 2017; 
Frey and Osborne, 2017). And ‘substituting workers’ with drones in steel industry op-
erations, as a specific remit of the RFCS project, speaks directly to those fears. However, 
whilst interviewees across both plants identified that a direct effect of inserting drone 
technology creates potential for ‘substituting’ one group of workers, that is scaffold-
ers—which is mainly an outsourced task and lesser skilled routine work in the steel 
industry context—it was not viewed as a credible proposition for these technical-main-
tenance workers.
Our interviewees speculated that job losses are unlikely to transpire for both them and 
scaffolders (directly employed and/or contracted), and instead speculated that drones 
might present a case for further recruitment. On scaffolding work specifically, it is noted 
that it is widely used across each plant for different activities and, at both sites, there are 
currently insufficient numbers of directly employed scaffolders to carry out all the work 
necessary. The predominant view at both plants is that the volume of maintenance work 
means that drones will merely allow for leakages (in chimneys, roofs and pipes) to be 
identified more quickly (as an intended effect) and generate greater volumes of work (for 
both scaffolders and maintenance workers). Far from workers being substituted, the in-
direct effect of the drone technology is to create more work and, without the greater in-
vestment in staff that our interviewees argue would be necessary, create the conditions 
for intensified labour. It is, however, difficult to imagine an already overstretched work-
force being given new resources for recruitment, particularly if they are to be expended 
on new digital technologies (see Neef et al., 2018). Hence, drones might not lead to job 
losses and the predicted technology induced unemployment of Industry 4.0, but of this 
digital technology there is potential for greater work intensity, the corollary of which has 
long been shown to be greater stress, greater risk of injury, and greater mental and phys-
ical exhaustion (Marglin, 1974).
Our interviewees in Italy commented that there is currently too much work and too 
few workers, but also that should workers be freed up from roof inspections by drones 
(as a direct effect), other tasks could easily be found and perhaps allow for greater 
productivity:
There are so many things to do, it wouldn’t be a problem to find him something else to do 
(Galvanising, Maintenance Engineer, Section Leader, SteelCo.IT)
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Similarly, at SteelCo.DE, interviewees imagined that drone use would increase the 
speed of monitoring pipelines and free-up workers—a direct and intended effect. 
However, our interviewees were also aware that the increased speed of monitoring 
(and thus greater efficiency) would mainly be attributed to separating the analysis of 
leaks from the actual inspection practice (i.e. walking along pipelines). These processes 
would normally be conducted concurrently, with the result that:
…far more information [will be collected], and this means that it has to be analysed. Which means 
that we will need human capacity to do the analysis of all the additional information. 
(Works Council, Operator, Team Leader, SteelCo.DE)
Hence, the separation of the inspection process and the analysis of the data gener-
ated creates a discontinuity from previous practice and without more investment, or 
asking more of workers (i.e. work intensification), drones are likely to create the direct 
but unintended effect of extending and slowing, rather than speeding, the monitoring 
process—with the consequence that anticipated efficiency gains are likely to be ne-
gated. Plant level regulations similarly incumber such efforts—at SteelCo.DE, for ex-
ample, safety regulations specify that two workers must always conduct pipe 
monitoring, which is current practice, with or without drones. Regulations thus be-
come an inscribed part of the technology, thereby extending Edwards’ and Ramirez’s 
(2016) immanence of effect beyond technology’s ‘physical world limits’, that is the 
drone’s technological capabilities and capacities. Here, workplace regulations inform 
working arrangements for its operation, and thus become part of and limit its inscribed 
capacities and intended effect, that is to replace workers.
Drones and the ‘effects’ on work
As indicated, the intended and direct effect of drone technology is to facilitate monitor-
ing by easing access (e.g. to chimneys, roofs and pipes) and allow for work to be con-
ducted in more efficient ways. The latter outcome seems questionable, but as another 
intended effect work might become safer. As a feature of the steel industry environment, 
health and safety has a high priority and, as an intended effect, drones might be re-
garded as just one further incremental feature of OHS protocols and measures (Nordlöf 
et al., 2015)—signalling, in this way, some level of continuity, rather than discontinuity, 
with wider organisational/sector practices. In both Germany and Italy, workers iden-
tified the benefits of reducing the need to work at height:
Sometimes we go up there, we don’t know the situation of the structure is old and there is a risk of 
falling. 
(Roof Inspection, Roofer, Section Leader, SteelCo.IT)
But, the technology also introduces new safety concerns, which indicates some level 
of discontinuity with regard to workers’ current experiences of safely conducting mon-
itoring tasks. This is an unintended effect, that is the technology is deployed to improve 
safety but, in its use, unintentionally introduces the potential for accidents:
…the drone is flying above, and you need to keep an eye on it, it means that you have to have one 
eye pointing above and one pointing below… So, I can imagine that this might actually increase the 
risk of accidents. 
(Works Council, Maintenance Engineer, Section Leader, SteelCo.DE)
Further, if work intensification is an indirect effect of drone insertion it might also 
compromise safety and negate any safety gains made, that is as workers succumb to 
pressures to work harder errors may creep in and comprise safety. But, overall, as an 
intended effect, the substitution of workers with drones for reasons of OHS seemingly 
represents a basis upon which workers embrace the new technology—the benefits 
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viewed to outweigh any new risks. At the same time, however, questions were raised 
by our interviewees on the extent to which workers’ enhanced safety might compro-
mise work processes and workers’ embodied skill sets.
The general consensus across the plants is that drones will not replace human main-
tenance and monitoring inspections without some information loss—essentially the 
direct effect of losing the worker’s presence (i.e. substituted by a drone) would be the 
unintended effect of ‘deskilling’ some aspects of operations, with the potential loss of 
experienced workers’ embodied knowledge (see MacKenzie et al., 2017: 742 on related 
themes). Interviewees at both sites caveated workers’ embrace of the drone technology 
by pointing out that embodied expertise and tacit knowledge, the ability to relate 
senses such as touch or sound, cannot be entirely substituted by drones equipped with 
thermographs or cameras:
Well, you develop a feel, for example you develop a feel for noises that are related to leaks… But 
someone who has never done that walks along the same path [and] they might not even notice the 
noise… you can develop a feel for this over time. 
(Service Division, Maintenance Engineer, Team Leader, SteelCo.DE)
The fact that the work is embodied, that is carried out by a human being in conjunc-
tion with the physical realities of the plant, means that the current inspection regimes 
have a range of characteristics that drones are unable to replicate in their replacement 
of workers—it is against this that any safety and efficiency gains (i.e. benefits) are 
measured by workers.
Added to such deliberations is the view at both plants that automation and the intro-
duction of new technology will create, in formal ways, a higher skilled workforce. It is 
a perspective that supports the views of those commentators, steel industry specific 
and otherwise, who suggest that emerging digital technologies will support higher 
skilled jobs for some (Naujok and Stamm, 2017) and necessitate negotiations on train-
ing, unless the skills are recruited or outsourced:
The use of very modern machines requires from our maintenance point of view…. better training, 
because there are some things you can learn from experience, but these are more dedicated things, 
so you need better [specialised] training… 
(Cold Rolling Mill, Maintenance Engineer, Section Leader, SteelCo.IT)
At the time of the research, it was unclear who exactly will need training and how 
intensive such training needs to be (depending on the precise way drones are to be 
inserted), and as predicted some (lesser skilled) workers may well miss out (Naujok 
and Stamm, 2017). However, UAV-based gas pipeline monitoring will require new IT 
and data analysis skills and it is a legal requirement to obtain a pilot’s licence for drone 
operation at both plants. Our technical-maintenance workers in Germany and Italy 
thus spoke positively about the benefits that might derive from drone use to the indi-
vidual, that is safer, upskilled work and, in this way, expressed some ownership over 
the forces of production, with such perspectives relating to the more extensive range of 
potential drone uses identified by our interviewees, in addition to pipe, roof and chim-
ney monitoring. The direct ‘effect’ of drones seems desirable, but fuller consideration 
also needs to be given to understanding drone ‘effects’ as a means for asserting mana-
gerial control, for example intensification, as discussed above, and heightened surveil-
lance, as next discussed.
Currently, fixed cameras are used in both plants, but do not follow workers and 
workers’ informed consent was required before the cameras were placed. In Germany, 
CCTV monitoring remains controversial and the Works Council has considerable say 
over the way such technology is introduced. Similarly, in Italy, all of the interviewees 
were very clear that legislation prohibits focusing cameras on people and filming them 
at their work: ‘It is not allowed here, you cannot film people working’. However, if 
surveillance for maintenance purposes is the intended and direct effect of the drone tech-
nology, we might anticipate the unintended effect of exposing workers to higher degrees 
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of surveillance from drones. Drone surveillance can take two forms: (i) direct observa-
tion of workers at their work, which at both sites data protection regulation prevents 
(as for CCTV), and (ii) increased surveillance of workers by means of the data gener-
ated from a wider array of sensors and software. The former represents a reconstitution 
in use, in the nature and application of surveillance technology, that is fixed cameras 
are used routinely, but drone cameras potentially allow for reconstitution in use, in their 
mobility and the extent and coverage of the visual data produced—a major obstacle to 
their use for the Works Council in Germany.
The sensor data would seem to allow for increased monitoring of the scope, scale 
and intensity of work conducted, that is dataveillance (Lupton, 2016). The generation 
of a ‘data-trail’ is an indirect effect that has yet to be fully considered by workers and 
their representatives. Certainly, as new technologies emerge, workers might question 
whether current data protection provisions remain fit for purpose. The threat is that 
digital technologies may display ‘function creep’ (Lupton, 2016). Thus, whilst workers 
may consent to drones and the gathering of data, if the data gathered are used for other 
purposes (e.g. performance management), the initial consent may never have been 
given. Currently, data protection regulations exist to protect workers from direct ob-
servation of their work activities and maintain dignity at work, but the scope for en-
hanced monitoring through technological surveillance, or ‘dataveillance’, becomes 
apparent (c.f. digital Taylorism). The generated data create space for evaluating perfor-
mance with a view to optimisation, competition and control. It is with such risks in 
mind that we next examine, as far as our data permits, worker representation in rela-
tion to the more deleterious ‘effects’ of drone technology.
Worker representation and participative arrangements
Edwards and Ramirez (2016) suggest that Industry 4.0 technologies possess the capac-
ity to empower workers, but for this to be realised workers their representatives must 
first understand the ‘effects’ of emerging technologies. There are, however, different 
foundations and distinct traditions regarding the shape and form of participative ar-
rangements at our plants in Germany and Italy, which reflect more broadly distinctive 
institutional frameworks and, in a more specific sense, structures and strategies of in-
dustrial relations and workplace governance and democracy within each site (see 
Lloyd and Payne, 2019). It is within the frame of such differences that the extent to 
which drone technologies possess the capacity for dis/empowerment can be 
discussed.
In Germany, it was evident that the role of the SteelCo.DE Works Council is sig-
nificant in the introduction of new technologies. Under the firm’s rules of participa-
tory governance, the RFCS project was subject to Works Council approval, but it 
became apparent that only management was consulted about the project. The Works 
Council had the right to veto the project (and drone use) and, at first, did so. The 
main worry was procedural, that is setting an unwanted precedent of non-consulta-
tion, but there was also disquiet regarding technology ‘effects’, for example substi-
tuting workers, workforce surveillance and new safety concerns. Eventually, the 
Works Council granted project approval on safety considerations, understood as a 
direct effect and clear benefit. Approval resulted in a Betriebsvereinbarung—a factory 
agreement—that outlines permissible usages of drones. Further, SteelCo.DE must 
inform the Works Council about all new applications and usages, and a more exten-
sive approval process will be required if a new use for drones is proposed that dif-
fers substantially from previous uses (e.g. a new use would be ‘surveillance of 
people’ whilst ‘monitoring coke oven gas pipelines’ would constitute the extension 
of an approved use).
The Works Council is clearly active on decision-making when introducing new tech-
nologies, considering its ‘effects’ in terms threats to jobs, dignity at work (i.e. surveil-
lance) and safety. It can shape, if not prohibit, the insertion of technologies and is 
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focused on the ‘effects’ vis-à-vis risks and benefits. Here, it seems, strong corporate or 
coordinated arrangements facilitate the incremental integration of technological inno-
vation (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which provides for workers’ more trust-based engage-
ment. Certainly, the way drone technology is being introduced, that is on a case-by-case 
basis, suggests an incremental approach—even if the technology itself provides for 
some level of discontinuity and might otherwise be regarded as ‘radical’. Further, whilst 
the role of the main trade union at the plant, IG Metall, was not remarked upon by our 
interviewees and we did not have the opportunity to interview union officials at the 
plant, lessons from elsewhere suggest similarly cautious approaches from the union to 
managing innovation (Reuter et al., 2017). And yet, our HR representatives reported on 
firm strategies to circumvent negotiations with IG Metall on the integration of digital 
skills to the existing workforce, by focusing on initial training provision (i.e. appren-
ticeships), rather than continuing vocational training, as well as insisting that drone-re-
lated upskilling will not translate into higher wages. Embedded within industrial 
corporatism, IG Metall’s traditional position of strength on such matters relies on high 
union densities, strong works councils and substantial disruptive potential, but over 
successive financial crises its power resource has tended to wax and wane, the corol-
lary of which is heightened employer confidence and increasing deviations from sec-
toral collective agreements (Dribbusch et al., 2018)—some evidence of which might be 
seen here.
At the site in Italy, we could not access the trade unions nor the rappresentanze sinda-
cali unitarie (i.e. Works Council), which is mostly dominated by the trade union Unione 
Italiana del Lavoro (UIL). However, in terms of representation it is noted that union 
density is high at the plant and all interviewees spoke of the need to consult with plant 
trade unions and seek agreement over the introduction of new technology. This was 
not perceived as an insurmountable issue—the unions had previously accepted cam-
eras and robotics in certain plant areas. However, the relationship between manage-
ment and unions is, as already commented, difficult. Whilst consultation might be 
made on the insertion of technology, our interviewees suggested some potential for 
worker and union resistance (which in Germany was not mentioned). Concerns about 
the risks of drones were generally attributed to the recalcitrance of some individuals, 
who tended to complain about everything: ‘One or two might object, but that’s because 
they object about everything!’ [Galvanising, Maintenance Engineer, Section Leader, 
SteelCo.IT]. All of our interviewees believed that if people were educated about the 
need for such innovations, they would generally be accepting—pointing out that if the 
use of drones (direct effects) was linked to positive outcomes, like enhanced safety, they 
would be received positively. Of course, as commentary from higher skilled workers, 
what is perhaps reflected is their greater job security (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014), 
with these same interviewees identifying production workers as most likely to fear 
and resist change, although it was stated that some technical staff also dislike change 
as ‘innovation brings risk’ [Steel Shop, Team Leader, Maintenance Engineer, SteelCo.
IT].
However, a more significant barrier to technological innovation was viewed to be 
poor managerial attitudes. Some of the workers interviewed have long been highly 
proactive in recommending drone technology and recognise the ‘feasibility of the tech-
nology’ and its likely high degree of success (Edwards and Ramirez, 2016), but they 
spoke of management’s hesitancy and prevarication:
When we suggested the drone applications, [management] weren’t interested… They will invest in 
particular equipment for production… that’s ok to spend but for new technology like this… that’s 
another matter. 
(Cold Rolling Mill, Systems Engineer, Section Leader, SteelCo.IT)
Opposition is blamed on a strong productivist ethos, characterised by short-term 
orientations associated with managerial predilections for centralised modes of control 
and unilateral decision-making ethos (despite claims to consultation), which entails 
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that production must take priority and overrides other considerations—an economic 
consideration in terms of degree of success, but not in ways anticipated by Edwards and 
Ramirez as a ‘means of accumulation for capital’ (2016: 110):
Every project we have or would like to start – the first question is always cost-benefit analysis; how 
much will it save? The priority is production. We have to run the plant first of all, then the innova-
tion projects. 
(Steel Shop, Maintenance Engineer, Team Leader, SteelCo.IT)
There was clear frustration with plant management, where a ‘productivist ethos’ 
prevented the insertion of technologies, such as drones, which might improve safety 
and enhance work. The capacity of unions or the works council to empower workers 
in this regard seems highly circumscribed and follows what Culpepper and Regan 
(2014) identify as a tendency towards reduced trade union influence in Italy, with the 
basis for organised responses diminished. On this, Hyman (2001: 155) notes that Italian 
trade unions were once characterised by ‘productivism’, with strong rights to control 
over production and sharing with management decision-making (e.g. on work organ-
isation, competitive challenges, innovation), but this has been eroded—informed by 
challenges within the working-class constituency, resulting in declining density (not 
the case here), and greater self-interest among skilled groups, which may begin to ex-
plain (anticipated) objections from some (less skilled production) workers to drone 
technologies. Thus, whilst the benefits of drone use are articulated quite clearly in Italy 
among those we interviewed, a broader absence of strong coordinated arrangements 
may weaken any ability to challenge management and mobilise against any emerging 
(Industry 4.0) threats and risks or, indeed, push for innovation insertion.
Discussion and conclusion
Drones are a powerful and innovative technology, but we can only speculate on 
whether they will be deployed systematically and with what specific ‘effects’ on work 
and employment—this is what we asked of our interviewees: anticipate the introduc-
tion of drones and determine the ‘effects’, with regard to potential risks and benefits, 
as understood within the context of steel industry workplace structures, tasks and rou-
tines. From this, we ask: on what basis might these intermediate to highly skilled tech-
nical-maintenance steelworkers embrace or resist new drone technology? To begin to 
address this question, and working from arguments that suggest management has a 
propensity to use technology as a means for strengthening control, we might imagine 
that steel industry employers would view digital technologies, like drones, as a means 
for workforce reductions, heightened surveillance and increased work intensification. 
This is in line with the RFCS project’s aims for enhanced productivity and efficiency in 
‘complex and expensive operations’. The evidence is that to greater or lesser degrees 
such potentialities exist.
However, the workplace realities described by our interviewees make drone inser-
tion highly contingent and these technical-maintenance workers possess relatively op-
timistic outlooks on the (un)intended and (in)direct effects of drone technology. Hence, 
what we first discuss is a challenge to the narratives that treat digital technologies and 
the risks they present as inevitable and determining. In the assessment of drone tech-
nology ‘effects’, it is necessary to consider the capacities (e.g. greater autonomy and 
discretion) that these intermediate/high-skilled workers have to shape (or imagine) 
the use of technology to their benefit, within the specificities of the steel industry work-
place. The reference here is to the basis upon which these workers accept innovations 
and their ‘effects’ (e.g. the capacity for upskilling and enhanced safety), when set against 
the risks posed (e.g. job loss, heightened surveillance, work intensification, deskilling) 
and the basis upon which workers and their representatives might question the inser-
tion of innovations, as did the Works Council in Germany.
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Here, the issue of job loss was not viewed as a plausible risk, seeming unlikely in 
these understaffed factories. In contrast to industry predictions, the scope is for in-
creased recruitment as an unintended effect, even for routine manual work (Naujok and 
Stamm, 2017). Further, any loss of embodied skill, or deskilling, is anticipated to be 
balanced by the need for technology induced upskilling, as a direct effect. There remain, 
however, ‘effects’ not hitherto fully appreciated by our interviewees, which may yet 
inform future opposition to/negotiations for drone innovation insertion. For example, 
in the absence of recruitment, intensification is a real possibility, which if realised may 
threaten any OHS gains as workers become overstretched. On surveillance, our inter-
viewees (and their representatives) find reassurance in data protection regulation, but 
the regulations might no longer be fit for purpose—the function creep of technology is 
an unintended effect that is difficult to guard against.
Nonetheless, our interviewees do not view themselves as hostages to drone technol-
ogy ‘effects’. Despite the volatility of the steel industry and its myriad uncertainties, 
such outlooks in relation to new digital technologies will be informed by these skilled 
workers’ past experiences on what costs jobs and what does not, particularly relating 
to discontinuity (i.e. levels of disruption) and degrees of success (i.e. the technology’s effi-
cacy and the negotiation of its adoption). In this respect, our workers’ perspectives 
may well convey an accurate view of the skill- and work-related effects and demands 
made by new workplace technologies (Autor, 2015). Thus, for our technical-mainte-
nance workers, the question is of what it means to be a technically skilled and autono-
mous steelworker, with the codified and embodied knowledge they possess (Polanyi, 
1966). What we find is that these workers seem sufficiently secure in the material real-
ities of their skilled status and skilled work, to welcome technological innovation and 
its ‘effects’—this might not always be said with the same confidence for (or by) those 
performing routine manual work, but as indicated the scope for further workforce re-
ductions in these plants seems limited (particularly if a firm prioritises production 
over innovation, as in Italy).
The point is made by Pfeiffer (2017: 31) that Industry 4.0 is meant to change the way 
we work, but it is a model that demands a high willingness of workers (and their rep-
resentatives) to cooperate with management, which brings us to our second observa-
tion concerning collective responses to technology ‘effects’. Here, it is necessary to 
consider socio-political choices and the role of participative arrangements, as a reflec-
tion of power and interests, in shaping whether, and in what ways, digital technology 
is inserted in the workplace—and from the workers’ perspective how capacity is fo-
cused on addressing the more deleterious ‘effects’ of technology. The critical question 
for our interviewees is the extent to which participative arrangements, in this highly 
collectivised industry, strengthen any ability to mobilise against emerging threats and 
risks, that is prevent the use of drones as a tool of atomisation and control, and allow 
for democratic debate and collective discussion on the insertion of the ‘digitalised ar-
tefact(s) of advancement’ (see Pfeiffer, 2017).
What we observe is that the strong corporatist arrangements in Germany and the 
role of the Works Council seemingly give greater scope for this and workers in this 
plant perhaps speak with more confidence on innovation—despite some evidence that 
management seeks to exploit any decline in IG Metall’s power resource (see Dribbusch 
et al., 2018). In Italy, consultation on innovation is claimed but the industrial relations 
environment seems difficult and fractured. Hence, despite our interviewees being pos-
itively inclined towards drones, a ‘productivist ethos’ informs technology decisions 
and there is little evidence that drones will be introduced at all, let alone in ways that 
positively enhance the material realities of employment. Further, unlike in Germany, 
our participants described potential cleavages along occupational-skilled lines (inter-
mediate and high-skilled workers vs. production worker grades) on technology inser-
tion (see Hyman, 2001), which renders innovation insertion contingent upon the way 
the labour process and the political apparatus of production coalesce for particular 
categories of worker (Burawoy, 1985).
What is articulated here is the differing fortunes of different categories of worker. 
Ultimately, the manner of technology insertion and the response to technology ‘effects’ 
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will be shaped by the interests, values, and visions prevailing in the workplace and the 
specificities of the institutional and industrial relations context that helps define them. 
Pfeiffer (2017: 33–35) speaks bleakly of Industry 4.0 and the capacity of labour to em-
ploy digitalised artefacts as ‘instruments of collective solidarity’, and suggests a con-
vergence towards ‘digital despotism’, with the likely hollowing out of labour rights 
and the democratic potential of industrial relations. But it is perhaps too early in the 
emergence of Industry 4.0 technologies to be definitive on Pfeiffer’s analysis and some-
thing of a challenge to it emerges out of the lens we have adopted. Our focus is on 
technical-maintenance worker perspectives on technology ‘effects’ and the delibera-
tions they make on the inherent tensions within digital technology, that is for more 
decentralised and autonomous work on the one hand, as these workers envisage, and 
digitised instruments of atomisation and control on the other, of which—admittedly—
the potential exists, but the likelihood is far from certain.
Thus, whilst the RFCS project promises a safer, faster, leaner steel industry, the ques-
tion our steelworkers have considered is whether this direction of travel involves en-
hancing or diminishing the material realities of their work and employment. What we 
know is that workers have a natural interest in their work being something that en-
riches rather than degrades them (Spencer, 2018), and the frequency with which the 
benefits from drones were highlighted as strong justifications for their use is testimony 
to this—it is the basis for their acceptance—and on this, it is perhaps, that workers 
recognise that it is not the machinery (effect) itself that threatens them.
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